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Although fair trade is a step in the right direction, this thesis argues that some of 
its claims and approaches may be problematic with respect to development goals.  As one 
of the world’s most highly traded commodities and an income source for tens of millions 
of people worldwide, coffee has become one of the star products championed by fair 
trade efforts aimed at sustainable development.  The discourse surrounding both fair trade 
and development has been affected by various theories and criticisms, which is 
considered in the literature review, influencing the overall trajectory of the discussion.  
This paper looks at some of the claims made by fair trade organizations, as well as claims 
made in response by direct trade organizations, identifying where claims overlap or there 
are gaps in the discourse.  By identifying overlaps and gaps, this thesis seeks to reconcile 
the large discussion surrounding development and the claims made by fair trade 
companies.  In doing so, these issues may provide a starting point for future researchers 
to delve further into the significance and impact of these approaches for the family farmer 
as well as provide suggestions for best practices for new or developing social justice and 
trade-oriented organizations. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
In a globalized world where economic systems reflect a continuing and deepening 
disparity between the North and the South, the fair trade model has become a popular 
means for which to advance development goals (Stiglitz 2003).  At the same time, fair 
trade has also become a place of overlap between markets and development efforts: 
nowhere can this be seen more easily than in the coffee sector.  More than 25 million 
people around the world rely on income from coffee to pay for school, medicine, 
transport and fuel (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 2009).  Within the coffee sector, 
organizations involved in development efforts have emphasized participation in formal 
economies as a way for families and producers to “enjoy secure and sustainable 
livelihoods, fulfill their potential and decide on their future” (Ibid.). Echoing the vision of 
the Fairtrade Labelling Organisations (FLO), the largest fair trade certifier in the world, 
these organizations believe that through trade poverty-stricken people “can overcome 
disadvantage and marginalization if they are empowered to take more control over their 
work and their lives, if they are better organized, resourced and supported, and can secure 
access to mainstream markets under fair trading conditions” (Ibid.).  It can certainly be 
argued that FLO has successfully impacted the lives of many small producers, and its 
sales continue to grow: in 2008, “Fairtrade certified sales amounted to approximately 3.4 
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billions [Euros] worldwide…[and between 2008-2009] the sales of Fairtrade certified 
products grew 15%” (FLO 2011).  These figures indicate continued consumer support 
and are crucial for addressing larger global disparities. 
However, a brief review of the literature confirms that these poverty-stricken 
people often have limited access to, among other things, information, programs, and 
markets, all arguably essential elements of market participation and, ultimately, 
empowerment.  It is these economically marginalized groups that are most in need of the 
benefits of fair trade but are least able to access them.  In addition, of all the coffee in the 
world that is produced (and it is the second-largest commodity behind oil), more than half 
is produced by family farmers (James 2000).  Alternatives for coffee farmers today 
consist of selling on the local market through traditional commodity supply chains or 
organizing into a cooperative in order to reach markets higher on the value chain, in what 
might be called the fair trade sector. As such, some farmers who are organized into co-
ops can choose to certify their coffee and obtain an internationally recognized minimum 
price for their efforts.  However, community impact assessments reveal a lag between the 
promise of third party certifications and farmer benefit, leading to criticisms within 
segments of the specialty coffee market (Richardson 2010, Consumers International 
2005).  Recent responses within this discourse included a trend towards transparency, 
traceability, and direct relations trade (Slob 2006, 9). Here, discourse refers to the larger 
discussion, or conversation, and the paradigmatic assumptions held by those both within 
popular culture or academia as to the meaning of the concept of  ‘development’ or ‘fair 
trade’ (see Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 6).  These assumptions both form the 
foundation for and direct the exchange of ideas on these issues.  The issues have proven 
 3 
important to both farmers in developing countries as well as consumers in developed 
countries, in the form of a general movement towards social justice for producers and 
discontented customers of conventionally certified coffees. 
This thesis critically assesses the discourse surrounding the fair trade and direct 
trade movement in coffee and the respective stated development goals of each movement.    
My inquiry focuses on how the fair trade movement and direct trade movements have 
built off of one another, thus expanding the discourse in order to achieve their stated 
goals.  As such, the literature review in chapters 2 and 3 considers the ways in which 
development theory has evolved and its influence on the current development discourse, 
particularly within the coffee sector.  In addition, I examine the ways in which the global 
capitalist economic systems have affected the relationship between consumers and 
producers, with an emphasis on the literature considering global supply chain analysis.  
This background will explain the historical bases for the current economic and social 
conditions for small coffee producers in developing countries. 
Chapter 3 explores how the fair trade coffee movement has evolved as a response 
to shortcomings and problems inherent in the traditional coffee commodity supply chain, 
while including in my discussion a case study of FLO as a representative of the fair trade 
movement and a case study of a direct trade company, Crop to Cup (C2C).  It is useful to 
include the direct trade movement in this discussion as it is a response to the perceived 
gaps of the fair trade movement, and a possible discursive trajectory within this sector.  It 
should be emphasized that while both movements share the same development objectives 
of empowerment and increased standard of living, the direct-relations model represents a 
different approach to these goals 
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Chapter 4 explains the methodology and research design for the analysis.  In 
comparing practices and processes of both FLO and C2C, I consider the overlaps and 
gaps between the two organizations and the ways in which those practices or processes 
affect the ultimate goals of development and producer empowerment.    The findings are 
detailed in Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 6 I discuss my findings and their implications with respect to the 
theories laid out in the first two chapters. Ultimately, I evaluate the discourse surrounding 
the fair trade movement in coffee against the more general discussion surrounding 
development; from there, I consider the direct trade movement as a response to issues 
inherent in the commodity market for coffee, the evolution of the fair trade movement, 
and the response of the direct trade movement as means of comparison.  By illuminating 
potential gaps, I hope to provide a starting place for future research on which methods or 
practices of fair trade organizations should be continued, which methods or practices may 
need tweaking, and other methods or practices that may be revealed as antiquated or 
misguided.  I conclude that this analysis will contribute to an advancement of fair trade 
principles within the overall discourse and greater empowerment for economically 
marginalized groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1: In the Beginning 
In order to illustrate the development theories and fair trade goals considered later 
in this analysis, it is helpful to first understand the history of coffee as a commodity in 
order to ground key concepts and establish a contextual framework.   This chapter 
explores the ways in which the historical background of the coffee industry has 
contributed to the obscurity of the producer in developing countries, particularly with 
respect to the consumer’s perspective.  In addition, this chapter considers a Marxist 
analysis of the evolution as coffee as a commodity in order to bring clarity to disparities 
of the modern day coffee supply chain. 
Coffee has a history deeply rooted in control and uneven power relations.  
Although the legendary discovery of coffee by Kaldi, an Ethiopian goatherd, dates back 
to roughly 800 A.D., it was not until several hundred years later that coffee was brewed 
and drank by Muslim peoples living in Arabia (Pendergrast 1999, 4-6).  In fact, the Arabs 
were the first to both cultivate coffee and begin its trade, and by the end of the fifteenth 
century, coffee had been introduced in Persia, North Africa, and Turkey (Ibid.).  Coffee 
was introduced to Europe through Venice, and despite Arabs’ efforts to control coffee 
cultivation exclusively by prohibiting the export of unroasted coffee beans and coffee tree 
seedlings, rendering beans sold outside of the country infertile, and banning foreigners 
from visiting coffee-growing sites—thus creating “a lucrative trade and the first 
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international commodity cartel—a cash cow that remains the holy grail for coffee 
growers around the world” (Dicum 2003, 71).  Despite these efforts, due to various 
security leaks and smuggling operations, by “the early eighteenth century the Dutch 
started its cultivation in their Asian and South American colonies, as [did] the French in 
the Caribbean” (Vieira 2008, 3-4). 
Coffee’s establishment in the colonies became an arena for the exercise of 
colonial power.  The most common type of coffee is the Arabica bean, followed by the 
robusta, for which the growth of both “is best between the two tropics” (Spiller 1998, 81).  
Coffee trees do not mature until three to five years after planting, and each tree yields 
about one pound of roasted coffee; the coffee growing process is quite labor-intensive, 
with a harvest period stretching over several months (Coffee Territory 2010). Unable to 
grow the frost-weary coffee tree in the home climates of most colonial powers, coffee 
became a lucrative cash crop grown by local peoples under colonial control in the tropical 
colonies.   As Luttinger and Dicum point out in The Coffee Book: Anatomy of an Industry 
from Crop to the Last Drop: 
[For] most European colonial powers, coffee was a dream crop: a habit-
forming, high-value tropical product that traveled well, with a ready market back 
home…[However,] accompanying its expansion was a litany of cruelly inhumane 
and rapacious practices used for cultivating the bean, practices that indelibly 
scarred the landscapes and peoples unfortunate enough to be associated with the 
crop.  Massive forest clearing and slavery were the seeming requisites behind 
growing coffee in virgin colonial lands, and the forces unleashed in this process 
have not yet played themselves out (2006, 25). 
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Thus as colonial powers imposed their work practices on local people in the 
colonies, so began the separation of the worker and his value in labor from the value of 
the commodity: native people worked the plantations, cultivating the crops, harvesting, 
and performing the necessary production tasks for export, and the colonial powers reaped 
the profits.  Further, as the demand for coffee grew worldwide, the European powers 
increasingly “brought coffee cultivation to their colonies, [and] the intensive labor 
required to grow, harvest, and process coffee came from imported slaves” (Pendergrast 
1999, 18).  Indeed, by the late eighteenth century, the French colony of Haiti had become 
the world leader in coffee exports, “supplying half the world’s coffee, cultivated with the 
labor of nearly half a million slaves” (Luttinger and Dicum 2006, 28).  In other countries, 
like Mexico, wealthy plantation owners “used the labor of indigenous people and 
peasants, often on the very lands that had been expropriated from them” with the blessing 
of the government (Jaffee 2007, 39). 
This separation of value from the worker critique found in Marxism, based on 
Marx’ theory of the production of value and commodity fetishism, has important 
implications for contemporary social movements in trade, particularly from the 
perspective of the consumer (see Marx 1976).  Specifically, Marx argues that this 
separation results in an alteration of the producer “individual’s social relation to what 
they produce and to the natural world” (Morrison 2006, 122).  For Marx, commodity 
fetishism allowed for products or commodities to take on a life of their own, thus hiding 
the worker and the value he added from the market and consumer; as will be explored 
further, the expanding and deepening complexities of the current supply chain only 
encourage this process.  Marx argued that capitalism is driven by the need to create 
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surplus value, otherwise known as the capitalist’s profit, and that the production of this 
value rests on the capitalist’s exploitation of the worker.  For Marx, the element of 
control over the labor-power of others is essential to the development of capitalism: in 
order to create more surplus value, the production process develops into a coercive 
relationship between the producer and the capitalist where the capitalist owns the means 
of production and the worker owns his labor power.  The lack of control over the means 
of production is the crux of the relationship because it is precisely that which causes the 
worker to sell his labor. 
For coffee, the foundation of coercive relations between workers and capitalists 
was thus established early on and evolved throughout the colonial and post-colonial 
periods.  Although the actors and their roles have changed from plantation owner to 
roaster or exporter and slave to wage-employee, these power relations are still reflected 
today in political and economic disparities between producing countries in the Global 
South and consuming countries in the Global North. 
Here, the implications of Marx’ theory on commodity fetishism are especially 
important for the producer: once the social relations of labor become hidden behind 
commodities as their own magical and independent beings, social responsibility and the 
power of individual producers are removed from the web of social relations in general.  
Further, Marx argues that the capitalist uses surplus value—or profit--to hide the social 
relations within the labor process and thus increase his own profit.  This obfuscation of 
the social relations is achieved through the fetishism of the commodity, where the 
commodity takes on an internal life of its own, and thus come to represent social relations 
between people, and people become the material relations between things.  The 
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significance of this process is well illustrated in the early history of coffee, general 
policies aimed at increasing production through exploitation of the worker and the 
coercion and conditions associated with their labor continued in part because of the 
increasing demand for coffee.  Marx’ argument suggests that the demand rose in spite of 
these conditions precisely because the coffee was its own magical being, disconnected 
from the reality of its production. 
During this period in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, as countries raced to 
secure a top position in the blossoming coffee market, demand continued to grow.  Brazil 
emerged as a leading producer, and plantations remained the dominant organizational 
structure for production.  The plantation model relied on division of labor, the gang 
system, and various measures of force and control over the workers—and, “until the 
middle of the nineteenths century, in most cases, the planter owned the product until its 
point of sale in a European country” (Daviron and Ponte 2005, 4).  In his article Colony 
in a Cup, Gregory Dicum shows how throughout the colonial period, both  the social 
relations and the “economic relationship between coffee producers and consumers [were] 
grossly unequal….The actual production of coffee represented but a small part of the 
price paid by the coffee consumer.  Transportation, distribution, and roasting all 
accounted for greater shares of the value” (2003, 73).  A similar structural supply chain 
and distribution of surplus value continues to dominate the coffee culture today; for now, 
it is important to note that the producers in these early historical cases were in many ways 
outside of the value chain, rather than being an active participant. 
It was thus in this context in the mid-1800’s that coffee acquired its character as 
an international commodity, as the “modern era had commenced.  Henceforth coffee’s 
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price would swing wildly due to speculation, politics, weather, and the hazards of war” 
(Pendergrast 1999, 20).  In part, this was due to increased production, but consumption 
also continued to rise, including low-income workers and rural people (Topik 2004, 24).   
In 1870, the “information about prices and demand and supply [of coffee] became 
internationally homogeneous,” and particularly with the creation of the New York Coffee 
Exchange in 1882, began an era of “institutionalized access to information” (Ibid., 27).  
This fluctuation in coffee’s price continued throughout the twentieth century: for 
example, an unprecedented rise in coffee prices in 1953 led to a “rise to a substantial 
increase in planting throughout the world and over-production followed.  Stocks 
increased, and in the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s, prices fell drastically” 
(International Coffee Organization 2007).  This dramatic fluctuation can also be seen in 
comparing the price of coffee more recently: in 1994, the price of coffee reached a 
historic high price of $1.82 per pound, while in 2001 the price of coffee had dropped to a 
low of $0.2376 (Loans & Credit 2010).  The inconsistency and sharp increases and 
decreases of coffee prices has a profound impact on the small producer, which is 
explored further on in this analysis. 
While it is true that historical statistics for the early coffee trade are “at most 
vague guesses,” this lack of data “particularly on domestic consumption but also on 
international trade, resulted from the neglect of infrastructure for internal trade, the 
weakness of new states, and the underdeveloped nature of commodity markets” (Ibid. 4).  
However, despite this lack of data, the international commodity character of coffee was 
established in several ways: first, the sheer size of the market and its global features.  In 
this sense, colonialism “served as the primary reason for and vehicle of coffee’s spread 
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through the globe; colonial powers dictated where coffee went and where it did not and 
established trading relationships that continue to this day” (Luttinger and Dicum 2006, x).   
In this colonial era, various countries competed against each other in the coffee market by 
increasing production, reducing labor costs via slavery or peasant workers, and 
international exportation for consumption—it was thus colonialism which encouraged the 
strengthening of coffee’s character, and colonialism’s system of disparate power and 
economic relations remains the base of the market today.  The historical trends outlined 
above continued, with labor and the producer being hidden from the subsequent market 
transactions and an ongoing and deepening disparity from the value received by the 
landowner versus what was received by the producer. 
2.2: From Colonized to Capitalized 
With the worldwide disintegration of colonization, beginning with Latin America 
in the mid-1800’s and spreading across the globe to end in Africa, many newly 
independent coffee-producing countries often found themselves facing obstacles that 
were not so removed from their colonial past.  Generally, the economic inequalities of 
colonialism: 
were maintained, and often further institutionalized…Upon attaining 
independence, former colonies were left with no option but to continue producing 
the products of colonial hegemony if they were to participate in the global 
economy.  The hope [of this concept of] “national development” was that the 
economic legacy of colonization could be used to initiate a diversification of the 
economy (Dicum 2003, 73). 
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Thus, the colonial legacy can be seen in the failure of most post-colonial countries to 
actually accomplish this economic diversification.  Generally, states and governments 
themselves played a relatively small role in the production and trade process; however, 
despite the fact that for most coffee-producing countries “state institutions were slow to 
come about, public power was exercised by oligarchs just as it had been by colonials” 
(Topik 2004, 30).  For many workers this meant sharecropping or indentured servitude—
and, again, a limited role and restricted market as an actor in the supply chain. 
Further, while the “terms of trade appear to have favored coffee exporters 
[particularly under the plantation model, at the end of] the nineteenth century…in the 
twentieth century…state capitalist cartels, price supports, and marketing boards, and 
cooperatives arose in cultivating countries” (Ibid., 31).  While in earlier times the coffee 
market was centered on production and exportation, the twentieth century saw the rise of 
more complex trade networks, corporations, and government controls.  The infrastructure 
necessary to maintain these entities and processes were based in the Global North 
countries, while newly independent countries—with the exception of Brazil—often 
lacked the resources to institute similar features into their own economies.  The United 
States, in particular, was instrumental in aiding the development of a coffee trade 
infrastructure; this “infrastructure included the centralization of the coffee roasting 
industry, technological innovations facilitating higher yields, increasingly efficient 
transport mechanisms, and geopolitical developments favoring the growth of symbiotic 
relations between the United States and key producing countries” (Luttinger and Dicum 
2006, 34).  The impetus of these changes arose from a variety of global changes, 
including advancements in industrialization, communication, and technology. 
 13 
2.3: The Smallholder and the State 
At the same time that this centralized model arose in the Global North, the 
economies of in the Global South were in a precarious position: with the end of forced 
labor, the plantation model of the colonial era became less workable, although “the 
management of international commodities was considered a private problem” until the 
1920s (Daviron and Ponte 2005, 11).  Cash crop farming had the potential to increase 
national wealth and growth.  Domestically, governments sought to achieve this through 
various systems of land reform and farmer subsidies, while internationally negotiating 
agreements to regulate exports through quotas and tariffs.  These agreements often 
allowed for preferential trade terms between a former colony and colonial power; 
however, “colonialism and…informal imperialism continued to influence…the terms of 
trade in ways that favored Europe and North America” (O’Brien 1997, 86).  Thus these 
agreements served to increase economic dependency in the former colonial coffee-
producing countries, rather than decrease it—ultimately placing those countries in a 
worse position when faced with later neoliberal reforms. 
However, because post-colonial countries had inherited cash-crop economies, the 
twentieth century saw a shift in global agriculture for small farmers “away from 
traditional subsistence farming and toward mega mono crop farming” (The Shift of Land 
Program 2010).  This shift, however, was unique to each country and its circumstances, 
producing different regimes and results, and thus making it difficult to generalize 
conditions and actions of the state or smallholder populations.  For example, in several 
Central American countries, the twentieth century merely saw the exchange of power 
from colonial actors to the dynastic coffee elite—large landowners, processors, and 
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exporters—who influenced and often controlled political institutions (see Paige 1997).  In 
other countries, the intergovernmental obligations negotiated through agreements 
encouraged the participation of the smallholder by offering leases and long-term 
contracts.  The early 1900’s also saw the establishment and growth of organizations 
representing coffee producers: for example, the Columbia Coffee Federation, founded in 
1928, was “a quasi labor union that represented coffee producers…and quickly became 
the political voice for rural farmers who had little clout and minimal access to policy 
makers” (Frank 2004).  In Mexico “postrevolutionary agrarian reforms began to 
redistribute coffee land and local people stole coffee seedlings from nearby plantations,” 
creating a new class of smallholder producers (Jaffee 2007, 39). 
Even up to and following the Second World War, countries across the world 
engaged in policies of what David Harvey calls ‘embedded liberalism.’  This form of 
‘political-economic organization’ was defined by the ways in which “market processes 
and entrepreneurial and corporate activities were surrounded by a web of social and 
political constraints and a regulatory environment that sometimes restrained by in other 
instances led the way in economic and industrial strategy” (Harvey 2005, 11).  In the 
social realm, these constraints took the form of labor unions, solidarity movements, and 
general suspicion of big businesses; political constraints were both positive and negative, 
but often included both creating an environment conducive to business and economic 
growth and protecting the rights of the worker. 
In spite of the varying histories, economies, and governments of coffee-producing 
countries , what was common in this era, was the conglomeration of roasters in the 
Global North into multinational corporations and the increase of “the ongoing struggle 
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for monopolistic control and regulation of a sector capable of generating tremendous 
revenues and power…Increasingly powerful, the roasting corporations eventually became 
nearly indistinguishable from government in matters of coffee as they worked closely 
together to ensure that trade agreements and policies aligned with their own agendas” 
(Luttinger and Dicum 2006, 34).  The concentration of the value gained from coffee in 
the Global North resulted in deepening economic disparities that especially effected 
producers in developing countries. 
In considering these disparities between the Global North and the Global South, 
global value-chain (GVC) analysis can provide a helpful framework.  GVC analysis 
focuses “on the dynamics of inter-linkages within the productive sector, especially the 
way in which firms and countries are globally integrated,” and thus “allows for an easy 
uncovering of the dynamic flow of economic, organizational and coercive activities 
between producers within different sectors even on a global scale” (Kaplinsky and Morris 
2001).  Here, GVC analysis maybe most helpful when considering the factors of 
governance structure and institutional framework.  Agricultural commodities, including 
coffee, “tend to fall in the category of buyer-driven chains, in which large retailers in 
industrialized countries, brand-name merchandisers, and international trading companies 
are the key actors in setting up decentralized networks of trade in developing countries” 
(Ponte 2002, 1101).  This process almost universally excludes the smallholder from 
participation, and “strategic choices” made by the actors in the Global North “have 
shaped entry barriers” to the market throughout the value chain (Ibid., 1112).  Although 
these barriers had previously been relatively low because of government intervention via 
price stabilization, input and credit supply, trade agreements and national protective 
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measures, the rise of the role of roasters and controlling the governance structure of the 
coffee supply chain created new barriers (Ibid., 1113).  For example, these barriers 
included requiring minimum quantities from producers or costly or impractical 
technological innovations which could only be undertaken by large firms or capitalist 
actors. 
GVC analysis can also be illuminating when considering the institutional 
framework of the coffee chain.  While regulated markets of the first half the twentieth 
century “created a relatively stable environment where rules were relatively clear, change 
politically negotiated, and proportions of income fairly distributed between consuming 
and producing countries,” in the second half of the twentieth century the coffee chain 
changed dramatically, with market relations replacing political negotiations and 
producing countries disappearing as actors (Ibid.).  The terms of market relations were 
increasingly dictated by roasters in the Global North as they geared towards vertical 
integration, controlling larger and larger segments of the coffee chain, a process only 
made easier by the looming neoliberal reforms. 
 
2.4: Neoliberal Reforms 
Following the rapid increase in globalization and trade of the early twentieth 
century, the era of the 1930’s after the First World War saw the spread of a global 
economic depression, high rates of unemployment, and a decrease in trade activity.  The 
price of most commodities declined sharply, including coffee, which “fell by 60 percent 
between 1929 and 1931, and continued at low levels for the rest of the decade” (Fishlow 
1980, 104).  Smallholder producers in developing countries were often especially hard-hit 
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as they scrambled to increase their output in response to lower prices, which resulted in a 
surplus of coffee, thus decreasing prices further. 
The predecessor for the neoliberal reforms of the 1980’s was the Bretton Woods 
Conference of 1948.  The global Depression and a devastating world war provided the 
backdrop for the meeting of global leaders of the Western world in 1948, and the whole 
world was eager to encourage trade and stimulate economic growth.  In order to support, 
monitor, and control that trade and growth, the Bretton Woods conference created three 
international institutions.  It is important to note at the outset that a key concept of these 
institutions rested on the explanation and prescriptions of economist John Maynard 
Keynes, who said that the role of governments should be to “help stimulate aggregate 
demand.  In cases where monetary policy is ineffective, governments could rely on fiscal 
policies, either by increasing expenditures or cutting taxes” (Stiglitz 2003, 11).   This was 
the ideological foundation for the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (now 
reconstituted as the World Trade Organization): in order to prevent global economic 
crises, international institutional intervention was sometimes necessary. 
The IMF was originally charged with extending short-term loans to countries 
unable to stimulate aggregate demand on their own; the World Bank generally extended 
long-term loans for projects like dams and roads; and the GATT regulated a system of 
quotas and tariffs on imports and exports between member countries (Stiglitz 2003, 3-
22).  Overall, the “international trade and development regime of the early period was 
characterized by national and international capital controls, a degree of international 
market regulation for commodities, and calls in international forums for a new 
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international economic order premised, among other things, on major changes in the 
international trade system to benefit Southern producers” (Fridell 2006, 10).  This 
thinking reflected the interventionist strategies put forth by Keynes as well as the 
embedded liberalism discussed above. 
However, in the 1980’s these institutions underwent a dramatic change under the 
rhetoric of free-market neoliberal polices espoused by leaders in the Global North like 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Regan.  This ideology “saw government as the problem.  
Free markets were the solution to the problems of developing countries,” and thus the 
protectionist measures that had been in place to protect the fragile economies of 
developing countries were summarily dismantled (Stiglitz 2003,15).  Following the 
global economic crisis at the end of the 1970’s, developing countries, without well-
established economies and with few resources to protect their populations, appealed to 
the international community for assistance.  The World Bank began providing financial 
support via structural adjustment loans, permitted only upon IMF approval and the 
agreement by the developing country to imposed conditionalities meant to encourage 
economic growth, at least in theory (Ibid.).  However, in reality these harsh 
conditionalities were more of a benefit to the Global North, imposing strict regimes of 
use and steep penalties for default in order to protect the North’s financial investment. 
The main tenets of these conditionalities were premised on privatization, trade 
liberalization, and governmental fiscal austerity to reduce national deficits.  Privatization 
is accomplished by “converting state-run agencies into private ones; trade liberalization is 
the lowering of trade barriers in order to allow for greater competition and market access; 
and governmental fiscal austerity can be accomplished through cutting expenditures 
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(Ibid., 53).  Inherent in these policies are assumptions based in the history and 
infrastructure of the Global North—assumptions which often had disastrous 
consequences for developing countries.  For example, without a stable economy or a 
developed national market that could be found in the Global North, producers and 
workers in developing countries were unable to produce as much as cheaply as their 
technologically advanced foreign competition, and these places became dumping grounds 
for Northern corporate commodities.  With respect to agriculture, particularly, the logic 
was that developing countries “would prosper through a comparative advantage in 
agricultural commodities due to cheap labor” (Watson and Archinelli 2008, 225). 
Small producers were especially affected, and as the “race to the bottom” in 
production continued and the price of commodities (including coffee) continued to drop, 
smallholders were often the biggest losers.  In addition, neoliberal reforms often required 
that “all forms of social solidarity were to be dissolved” in favor of its pro-individual and 
pro-market policies, dismantling trade unions and other organizations and arenas that 
leant workers a political voice (Harvey 2005, 23).  In other places, where state-run 
industries were converted to private ownership, the lack of accountability led to 
corruption of industries, downsizing, and reduction of employee benefits.  Ultimately, 
these policies and reforms led to a “momentous shift towards greater social inequality 
and the restoration of economic power to the upper [classes,]” both in the Global North 
and the Global South (Ibid., 26). 
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CHAPTER III 
FAIR TRADE BEGINNINGS AND DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE 
In describing the history of the fair trade movement, it seems important to begin 
by pointing out that within the current discourse there exists no one agreed-upon 
definition of what, exactly, constitutes fair trade; as Douglas L. Murray and Laura T. 
Raynolds point out in their essay “Globalization and its Antinomies: Negotiating a Fair 
Trade Movement,” fair trade “is perhaps the most dynamic of a range of movements, 
campaigns, and initiatives that have emerged in recent decades in response to the 
negative effects of globalization” (2006, 4).  However, it is possible to derive some 
general characteristics of fair trade organizations, most who aim: 
1. to improve the standard of living of producers in developing countries by 
paying a higher price and improving market access; 
2. to promote development opportunities; 
3. to encourage policies of transparency throughout the supply chain 
4. to raise awareness among consumers of the negative effects on producers of 
international trade and to influence those consumers’ choices in a socially 
conscious manner 
5.  to promote social justice, safe and sustainable environmental practices, and 
protect economic security (Ibid., 5). 
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For the purposes of this discussion, the historical route and relevant factors focus 
on the first three characteristics, although the role of the consumer and social justice are 
certainly necessary elements of the greater fair trade discourse.   The emphasis here is on 
the individual producer and the greater development goals of an improved standard of 
living and empowerment, and as such will consider the ways in which the history of the 
fair trade movement has affected the shape and course of these goals. 
Further, there exists a tension between the concepts of fair trade as a movement 
versus fair trade as a market.  The market refers to more practical aspects of the brand 
and niche that fair trade occupies with respect to tradable commodities; the movement, on 
the other hand, encompasses the general discourse, claims, and paradigmatic assumptions 
within those places.  While these concepts are not entirely distinct, for example because 
the claims and assumptions of involved organizations impact the implementation and 
evolution of practices, and while both concepts are considered here, the emphasis is on 
the latter framework that considers fair trade as a movement.  
 
3.1: History and Background of the Fair Trade Movement 
Although the Fair Trade movement began before the majority of neoliberal 
reforms had taken place, the global response to the resulting deepening economic 
disparities between the Global North and South propelled it the center stage of the 
international trade arena.  However, the beginnings of the movement now described as 
“fair trade” are traditionally attributed to various church-managed charities that, in an 
effort generate income and raise the standard of living for impoverished producers in 
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developing countries, created trade networks and markets in the West for those 
producers.  These groups, known in the European Union as the ‘pro-third world 
movement’ and elsewhere called Alternative Trading Organizations (ATOs), increased in 
the 1960’s and, working with cooperatives or associations in developing countries, 
helped to establish and maintain the connections necessary for the producers to export 
their products.  Although the total market share captured by these ATOs remained rather 
insignificant on a global market level, the profile of alternative trade increased , and it 
began to be seen as a legitimate movement rather than just isolated efforts.  The strength 
and presence of these groups can be seen today in organizations like Ten Thousand 
Villages, a Mennonite nonprofit fair trade organization that “provides under- and 
unemployed artisans with an opportunity to earn vital income and improve their quality 
of life by establishing a sustainable market for their handcrafted products” in shops in 
developed countries (Ten Thousand Villages 2010). 
At the same time as these charity-based trade groups began to gain momentum, a 
twin political movement was also pushing the fair trade agenda, although in a more 
secular realm and often covering a greater variety and volume of products.  Daniel Jaffe 
distinguishes these two groups by categorizing the former as the “development strain” of 
fair trade, and the latter as the “solidarity” strain; for the solidarity groups, the slogan was 
“’trade, not aid’—an attempted to differentiate its philosophy of local development and 
empowerment through trade from the paternalism of charity and the inefficiency and 
corruption of foreign aid by (and to) governments” (Jaffe 2007, 13).  These groups 
especially sought to address the structural inequalities of the market, although they were 
often confronted by a challenge that would continue to plague the fair trade network for 
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years: how to effectively critique the market while at the same time working within that 
same market in order to achieve its goals.  This becomes a particularly significant point 
for later arguments, and particularly global value-chain analysis, regarding the ways in 
which the market processes and structures can pose obstacles for traditionally 
marginalized economic groups. 
Both movements, however, echo sentiments found throughout development 
discourse.  With respect to producers, development might be broadly defined first, as an 
effort to increase a standard of living, which can be measured by benefits like income, 
health, and security.  Second, development includes efforts to increase empowerment for 
marginalized peoples.  Although empowerment is certainly a multifaceted concept with 
many interpretations and meanings depending on its context, in the development 
framework it may be understood as increasing the power of individuals or groups to 
influence the institutions which affect them and a “process of [increasing] individual 
autonomy and [directing] transformation of a society towards more just and equal 
relations” (Bigdon and Korf 2004, 352).  With respect to coffee, these institutions include 
governments, trade regulating bodies, roasters, retailers, and consumers; clearly, the ways 
in which producers might engage or influence each sector range mightily, but for 
smallholders the ability to participate with institutions in these ways is often contingent 
on organization, state support, and specialty markets. 
The literature on development discourse reveals, however, that the goals of 
contemporary trade movements with respect to smallholder producers are problematic on 
many levels (Slob 2006, 5; Cowen and Shenton 1996, 25).  For the purposes of coffee 
and smallholder producers, two of the most challenging issues in development are the 
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concepts of universality and trusteeship.  With respect to universality, development 
discourse generally assumes common norms and definitions.  As Allan Kaplan explains:  
[Although] development theory has undergone many transformations over the 
years…there is little change.  For underlying the various theories of development 
which inform practice, there are certain paradigmatic assumptions which are 
largely unconscious, and to that extent hold practitioners captive (1999, 4). 
Within this framework, these paradigmatic assumptions lead to the larger proposition that 
the problems of developing countries are the same, including scarcity, poverty, and the 
ensuing violence.  In the same way, by applying these assumptions of universal concepts, 
the solutions for developing countries are also assumed to be the same, and manifest in 
the form of development science, practices, and institutions.  The benefits of these 
assertions of universalism are often limited to the justification and maintenance of the 
position and power of the developers, while the consequences of this universalism for 
developing countries often takes the form of failed development projects, increased state 
power and control, and a decreased standard of living for development’s target 
populations (Ferguson 1994). 
In addition, it could be argued that assertions of universalism allow actors with more 
access to resources and knowledge to direct development.  This reasoning is consistent 
with the concept of trusteeship, as explained by M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton in their 
work Doctrines of Development.  Cowen and Shenton trace the early notions of 
development throughout history; particularly, they look to the concept of trusteeship, 
developed by the Saint Simonians, whereas only “those who had the ‘capacity’ to utilize 
land, labor, and capital in the interests of society as a whole should be ‘entrusted’ with 
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them” (1996, 25).  This idea is clearly present in the notion of development experts and is 
evident in the development institutions and organizations, technology, and expertise 
generally contained within the Global North.  However, such assumptions rest on pre-
colonial attitudes and routinely neglect local knowledge and participation, which is often 
crucial to development program’s success.  In coffee as well as other commodities, fair 
trade efforts were often directed out of one region and onto another. 
 
3.2: Fair Trade and Coffee 
The first official fair trade label for coffee was created in 1988 for a Dutch 
development aid organization, Solidaridad, that had developed a relationship with a 
coffee cooperative in Oaxaca, Mexico.  Although the cooperative had been selling coffee 
through charity-based organizations like those described above for years, the Oaxacan 
producers approached “the European alternative trade movement [and asked that they] go 
beyond its largely symbolic purchases and buy coffee in volumes sufficient to make a 
significant difference in the incomes of [the cooperative’s] peasant farmers” (Jaffe 2007, 
13).  In response to the Oaxacan farmer’s request, Solidaridad created a label called Max 
Havelaar, named  after a historical figure that, as a government official who worked in 
Dutch colonies, “struggled without success against the deplorable conditions” he found 
were widespread throughout the Dutch coffee plantations (Max Havelaar 2010).  The 
new label, as opposed to being an alternative to already existing commercial coffee 
brands, instead “could be placed on coffee sold under any brand, certifying that the coffee 
farmers had received a premium price that constituted a ‘fair return.’ The Max Havelaar 
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foundation licensed the use of the label to existing coffee roasters and retailers who 
agreed to comply with its criteria of fairness in trade” (Jaffe 2007, 13). 
Other fair trade groups immediately followed the lead of the Max Havelarr label, 
and fair trade certification labels began appearing on coffee brands across Europe.  
ATO’s began to unite in an effort to reach larger producer groups, as well as capture 
larger market shares.  Perhaps most significantly, in “1997, all of the national 
certification entities formally united their efforts, creating a worldwide umbrella fair-
trade certifier, FLOs International (FLO), based in Bonn, Germany” (Ibid., 15). 
FLO’s purpose is to “set Fairtrade standards, support disadvantaged producers 
and coordinate the development of the global strategy on Fairtrade”.  In order to 
accomplish these goals, FLO’s governing structure, operating under German law, is set 
up to reflect a cooperative and democratic process: first, each of the fair trade initiative 
members and producer organizations is a member of the General Assembly (FLO 2009).  
The General Assembly meets once a year to vote on board members, other membership 
issues, and to approve annual accounts, with each member having one vote (Ibid.). 
The Board is mainly responsible for strategic operations and appointing the three 
committees of the organization which are meant to “provide expertise and oversight in 
key areas” (Ibid.).  There are three committees: first, the Standards Committee, which 
considers and sets Fairtrade standards; second, the Finance Committee, which oversees 
FLO’s finances; and third, the Nominations Committee, which is “responsible for 
recommending and reviewing appointments to the Boards and Committees.  It defines the 
roles and responsibilities of these positions, and reviews the performance of board and 
committee members” (Ibid.).  Beyond these committees, FLO has multiple departments 
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and staff members who are responsible for administering FLOs plans and projects.  
Again, this governance structure can be seen as reflecting FLO’s commitment to 
democracy, transparency, and accountability; but, as will be argued further, as has been 
seen with many international organizations, the very same bureaucratic structure that 
makes FLO’s work and effects on producers possible can also result in the organization’s 
inflexibility, resistance to change, and limitations by its own bound procedures. 
 
3.3: Standards and Certification 
TABLE 1: FLO PRINCIPLES AND PROGRAMS 
FLO Process/Program: Goal: 
Principle:   
• Development Price Improved standard of living 
for farmer 
 Premium Community development 
• Empowerment Farmer input Participation of local 
populations for best 
practices 
 Ethical/informed decisions 
of consumer 
Decreased global 
inequalities through trade 
• Access to Programs Certification Accountability, consumer 
confidence 
 Pre-export credit Farmer economic security 
 Education and training Informed and independent 
farmers 
• Access to Markets Specialty coffee Increase market, add value 
• Access to 
Information 
Transparency Legitimacy, accountability 
• Collapse of Supply 
Chain 
Partnerships with farmer 
cooperatives 
Reduce actors on supply 
chain to ensure greater 
value goes to farmer 
 
As mentioned, FLO’s Standards Committee is responsible for overseeing the 
development of Fairtrade standards.  These standards are “the collective requirements 
that producers and traders must meet as applicable to be certified as Fairtrade,” and, as 
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FLO emphasizes, they are standards within which the stakeholders (i.e. producers and 
traders) have had the opportunity to contribute their own input and feedback at multiple 
stages in the process (Kratz 2006).  Although FLO has specific product standards relating 
to specific processes or treatment of commodities, there is also a set of generic standards 
that apply to all traders and producers of Fairtrade products: first, producers must be paid 
the Fairtrade minimum price, meant to cover the cost of sustainable production and 
calculated on a product-by-product basis; second, producers must receive a Fairtrade 
Premium, which is an additional amount that producers can reinvest in development and 
related projects; third, producers must be paid at least partially in advance if they ask for 
it, in order to cover the costs associated with the beginning of the growing season and 
meant to avoid issues of credit and debt; and finally, all companies dealing with Fairtrade 
products must sign contracts that “allow for long-term planning and sustainable 
production practices” (FLO 2009).  In addition, in order for producer organizations (i.e. 
cooperatives or farmer associations) to be members, they must be both made up of 
smallholders, or family farmers, and the producer group must be both democratic and 
politically independent (Slob 2006, 20). 
Originally, in order to ensure certification FLO used to oversee certification 
through an internal certification unit; however, in response to the criticism that “FLO was 
both the custodian and the certifier of the standard, while in other systems the two 
functions were kept separate,” the body has since become independent and is now known 
as FLO-CERT (Ibid., 21).  The shift was an effort to encourage FLO’s foundational 
policy of transparency (Ibid.).  For FLO, the certification is a signal to consumers that the 
product meets FLO’s fair trade standards, and that when consumers buy products with a 
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fair trade certified label “disadvantaged producers get a better deal” (FLO 2011).  To 
further that end FLO engages FLO-CERT to ensure “independent scrutiny of a rigorous 
third-party certification” that has the interests of the producer at heart (Ibid.). 
From the producer side, in order to become certified through FLO, a producer 
organization first submits an application to FLO-CERT, which requires a listing of the 
products themselves, production processes used, and information about the applying 
organization.  Also, and significantly for this paper’s purposes, the application must 
include a certification fee, which varies depending on the number of members in the 
organization, and whether that organization represents a cooperative or a plantation.  
Once that amount is paid, an auditor personally visits the production sites and check to 
make sure it meets the standards of the compliance criteria.  The results of the audit are 
sent back to FLO-CERT for evaluation, and non-conformities with standards are noted; 
the producer can then suggest measures to correct the non-conformities, and once these 
issues have been solved, the producer is then issued a fair trade certification (FLO-CERT 
2010).  Currently, FLO certifies more than 14 individual commodities, including tea, 
bananas, sports balls and wine, although, as can be understood through the history of the 
fair trade movement described above, “coffee remains the backbone of market” (Lyon 
2006, 453). 
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3.4: A Response to Fair Trade: Direct Relations Trade 
TABLE 2: C2C PRINCIPLES AND PROGRAMS 
C2C Process/Program: Goal: 
Principle:   
• Development Price Improved standard of living 
for farmer 
 Premium Community development 
• Empowerment Farmer input Participation of local 
populations for best 
practices 
 Farmers get feedback Informed farmers, product 
improvement 
 Ethical/informed decisions 
of consumer 
Decreased global 
inequalities through trade 
• Access to Programs Education and training Informed and independent 
farmers 
• Access to Markets Specialty coffee Increase market, add value 
 All non-specialty coffee 
grades 
Improved standard of living 
for farmer 
• Access to 
Information 
Transparency Legitimacy, accountability 
• Collapse of Supply 
Chain 
Relationships with 
individual farmers 
Reduce actors on supply 
chain to ensure greater 
value goes to farmer 
 
Thus, Fair Trade remains an appealing and positive alternative for smallholders 
and producers in developing countries.  However, as the Fair Trade movement generally 
has grown and streamlined its processes and standards, some critics have revealed a 
concern over the true impact on smallholders;, some community impact assessments 
reveal a lag between the promise of third party certifications and actual farmer benefit 
(according to Richardson; Slob; Weber). The direct relations trade movement of coffee is 
one response to the homogenization of fair trade, with an increased emphasis on single-
source origins and individual farmer relationships (Miller 2007).  In understanding direct 
relations trade as a response to the fair trade movement, it important to note that although 
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both fair trade and direct relations trade use different approaches and different incentive 
schemes that aim to contribute to what might be called ‘development goals.’  The goals 
themselves are essentially the same: to increase empowerment and standard of living 
among poverty-stricken producers and farmers, per the development principles discussed 
above.   In many ways the two movements incorporate similar approaches: for example, 
using price premiums, systems of extended credit, and community building efforts.  
However, many direct relations trade companies also employ various processes and 
methods that differ from traditional Fair Trade schemes, such as by rejecting certification, 
by  passing cooperatives in favor of individual contracts, direct communication between 
consumers and producers, and capacity-building and increased ownership for producers. 
One example of a response to the Fair Trade movement and the issues raised 
above can be seen in C2C Coffee Company, a direct trade coffee company based in the 
United States that works as a service provider to farmers in developing countries.  C2C 
aims to build relationships with family farmers and farmer groups and then connect these 
farmers with their consumers via internet technology.  As such, C2C consciously rejects 
traditional certification methods, inviting customers to “see for themselves” the farmer’s 
practices, while maintaining a policy of transparency and traceability throughout the 
supply chain.   The company’s own supply chain is set up to work with smallholder 
families, as opposed to cooperatives, and set up multi-stakeholder local Coffee 
Committees.  These Committees act as the democratic stakeholder group and point of 
contact for the farmer constituency.    The Committees are also charged with 
administering reinvested revenue from coffee sales, and must publish records online, 
respond to inquiries, gather data and post media.  C2C’s goal in its role as a service 
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provider for farmers, rather than as just an importer, allows the company to work towards 
its goals of farmer empowerment and increased market access for what it considers to be 
traditionally marginalized groups—smallholder and family farmers. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
In comparing the fair trade coffee movement against the direct trade coffee 
movement, this paper explores the ways in which the fair trade movement reflects general 
trends of the greater development discourse; then, because the direct trade movement 
represents a response to fair trade, the discussion focuses on claims of each movement 
against one another, considering the ways in which those goals and practices align or the 
ways in which they diverge.  These general practices and claims, which are indicative of 
the evolution and direction of the fair trade discourse, are reviewed with respect to the 
theories mentioned above and the possible issues that arise as those practices are applied 
to the smallholder.  In doing so, I focus first on the development discourse, and as such, 
the development goals of an improved standard of living and producer empowerment 
provide the framework for my analysis.  In defining my criteria for evaluation, it is 
necessary to define the terms I will be using and establish the limits of this discussion: 
here, I consider the trajectory of the overall fair trade discussion.  It should be noted, 
however, that the development discourse on fair trade does not exist in any one place; 
rather, it refers to the paradigmatic assumptions about fair trade and development.  As 
such, the factors are not limited by time and space, but rather by language and the 
discussion itself. 
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 As the discursive goals of most fair trade organizations are concerned with actual 
impact, I will consider effectiveness on a farmer level by comparing published data on 
the dollar value paid that the producer or farmer level.  While fair trade encompasses 
more than just price, fair trade organizations themselves emphasize the higher payments 
and premiums.  I will focus my assessment on the theoretical issues that arise out of fair 
trade in its practices that seek to achieve the development goals of “poverty reduction and 
greater sustainable development” and whether the processes and practices in place of 
each movement create a space where farmers and producers “are empowered to take 
more control over their work and lives” (FLO 2009).   As case studies to represent each 
movement, I will use the FLO (FLO) to illustrate general practices in the Fair Trade 
coffee movement, and C2C Coffee Company as a representative of practices and claims 
of the direct trade movement.  I have chosen these companies as case studies because 
each employs processes and practices that, in reviewing the literature and claims of 
similar organizations, represent those within their overall respective movement. 
The criteria I have chosen are based on a review of existing companies dedicated 
to either the fair trade movement or the direct relations trade movement in coffee.  For 
fair trade, I looked to several organizations, including FLO, Starbucks, Green Mountain, 
and Global Exchange; for direct trade, I looked to C2C, Equal Exchange, Stumptown, 
and Intelligentsia.  Based on the mission statements, internal documents, and external 
literature, my review has revealed a number of consistencies in practices within each 
movement, and practices that appeared either consistent or common were included.  It 
should be noted, however, that there are many other areas where organizations for each 
movement might be compared, but in considering development and empowerment of the 
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producer—common axioms declared by most involved organizations—I have tried to 
limit my analysis to those practices which affect those goals. 
In considering the development discourse surrounding the fair trade movement, I 
am in a position to compare the claims and practices of actors within this movement to 
study how the discourse has evolved with the introduction of Direct Trade. This data will 
be derived from mission statements, internal documents, press releases, scholarly works, 
and popular literature.  As mentioned, there are several places where direct trade has 
embraced practices or principles put forth by early pioneers of the fair trade movement, 
including price premiums, systems of credit, and community investment.  For direct 
trade, these issues often mean a reinvention of an existing process, which might imply 
there are improvements to made in that area under Fair Trade.   
Next, I consider the areas where there is a gap, whereby the general discourse of 
one of the two movements fails to address the theoretical issues involved in commodity 
fetishism, global value chain analysis, or development.  A gap may indicate an area for 
improvement or where further research is needed, or it may indicate that a given claim 
has fallen out of the general discourse.  Further, a gap may indicate the failure of one of 
the two movements to address a particular principle of development, calling into question 
whether that movement’s methodology is lacking or whether that development principle 
is antiquated, unworkable, or impractical.  These areas may highlight specific concerns in 
moving forward, or it may indicate the need for possible shifts in the overall development 
discourse. 
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CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS 
To study the discourse of development within the fair trade movement and the 
direct trade movements in the coffee sector, I looked to mission statements, press 
releases, program descriptions, internal documents, conference proceedings, scholarly 
works, and popular literature.  From this I determined patterns of claims and practices 
consistent with advancing development and empowerment goals common within each 
movement.   
From there, I identified and reviewed specific claims by several organizations 
from each movement related to development and empowerment.  Rather than do an on-
the-ground analysis and evaluation of physical evidence, the focus is on how the claims 
bear out within the framework of development discourse. From the fair trade movement, 
I identified and reviewed claims made by FLO, and from direct relations trade, I 
reviewed claims made by C2C.  Finally, I compared the claims made by these 
organizations to discourse surrounding fair trade to determine alignment, gaps, and 
discrepancies between them.  Both FLO and C2C function as a micro- self-reflection of 
the fair trade discourse: here, an alignment of claims is likely reflective of the overall 
discourse; a discrepancy in these approaches, however, indicate a need for future study in 
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order to determine which approach is more beneficial to producers; a gap may indicate a 
change in the discourse and possibly future trends.  
 
TABLE 3: COMPARATIVE FINDINGS 
 FLO C2C 
Development:   
• Increased Standard 
of Living: 
• Price 
 
X 
• $1.25 minimum at 
export 
 
X 
• $.30 over 
NYBOT, paid at 
farm level + 
additional 
premium for 
quality 
performance) 
• Premium for 
community 
investment 
X 
• $.10 
X 
• $.20 per roasted 
pound sold put 
into community 
seedling project 
Empowerment:   
• Farmers get feedback  X 
• Farmers get input 
into process 
X X 
• Geared towards 
empowering 
consumers to make 
informed ethical 
decisions 
X X 
• Geared towards 
empowering farmers 
to make more 
informed decisions 
about their coffee 
business 
 
X 
Access to Programs:   
• Certification X  
• Pre-export credit X  
• Education and 
Training 
X X 
Access to Markets:   
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• Specialty Coffee (top 
10% of production) 
X X 
• All Other Grades 
Coffee 
 X 
Access to Information: X X 
Transparency: X X 
Actors Between Farmer and 
Roaster on Supply Chain: 
2:  
cooperative, importer 
1:  
importer 
 
5.2: FAIR TRADE LABELLING ORGANIZATION 
As mentioned, the FLO (FLO) represents the united efforts of multiple actors 
throughout the global fair trade supply chain for many commodities, including coffee.  
Based in Bonn, Germany, FLO works with producers organized into cooperatives in 
developing countries whose work and products meet certain standards.  With respect to 
overall development goals, FLO’s vision describes the belief “that people can overcome 
disadvantage and marginalization if they are empowered to take more control over their 
work and their lives, if they are better organized, resourced and supported, and can secure 
access to mainstream markets under fair trading conditions” (FLO 2009).  This statement 
is consistent with general development discourse and represents the goals of fair trade 
groups generally. 
FLO’s efforts towards defining empowerment can be seen its vision describing “a 
world in which all producers can enjoy secure and sustainable livelihoods, fulfill their 
potential and decide on their future” (Ibid.).  This definition of empowerment emphasizes 
its subjective nature and seems to indicate an individual-centered approach.  Further, 
FLO states that it seeks to increase farmer or producer empowerment through 
organization, increasing resources and support, and secured access to markets (Ibid.).. 
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These efforts can be seen in FLO’s relationships with producer cooperatives, premium, 
pre-export credit and certification programs, and commitments through contracts. 
With respect to certifications, FLO furthers its aims of employing trade as an 
instrument of sustainable development “through standard-setting and certification 
processes for use by Producer and trading organizations” (Ibid.).  The certification 
process is done through a third-party system, and FLO maintains two systems of 
standards: one is for small producer organizations, such as cooperatives, and the second 
is for hired labor situations.  Producers apply for certification by paying a 500 Euro 
application fee and meeting the standards of an audit (which, if approved, is generally an 
annual requirement with additional costs) (Ibid.). 
As mentioned, FLO’s certification system “is run by a separate company called FLO-
CERT….[which] ensures that relevant social and environmental standards are met and 
that producers receive the Fairtrade Minimum Price and Premium.” (Ibid.)..  These 
standards are created through a multi-stage review process, and involves “wide 
consultation with stakeholders,” including producer organizations (Ibid.).  For coffee, the 
minimum price paid by FLO for washed Arabica is $1.25 per pound at export, while the 
premium is an additional $.10 per pound.  In creating FLO-CERT as a separate 
organization from FLO itself, the two organizations seek to further reassure consumers 
that they “can be confident that the international FAIRTRADE Mark is only used on 
products that come from Fairtrade certified producers and that traders meet their 
obligations under the Fairtrade standards” (Ibid.).  FLO also offers pre-export lines of 
credit to producer organizations, and requires that “up to 60% of the purchase price 
should be pre-financed to the producer organizations” (Ibid.). 
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FLO’s program of Fairtrade Premiums gives producers an additional $.20 per pound 
of coffee, and “this money goes into a communal fund for workers and farmers to use to 
improve their social, economic, and environmental conditions.  The use of this additional 
income is decided upon democratically by producers within the farmers’ organization, or 
by workers on a plantation.  The Premium is invested in education and healthcare, farm 
improvements to increase yield and quality, or processing facilities to increase income” 
(Ibid.).  This premium is clearly aimed at development efforts, with an emphasis on 
community-building and wellness. 
In addition, with respect to training or programs for producers, FLO maintains a 
Producer Services and Relations Unit that supports producers by “providing training in 
local languages; offering guidance on certification requirements; helping producers to 
gain access to new markets; [and] facilitating relationships with buyers” (Ibid.).  This can 
be especially important as FLO cannot guarantee buyers for these products, a concern of 
large and small producers across markets globally.  However, as mentioned, as part of 
their development efforts the members of FLO “aim to facilitate the access to markets for 
goods and services coming from…target groups [including disadvantaged Producers and 
workers in countries of the developing world, working as associations of small-scale 
Producers and worker organizations]” (Ibid.).  These are groups traditionally denied 
market access because of insufficient scale of production, integration of technology, and 
lack of resources. 
As such, FLO believes that “embracing transparency and stakeholder participation is 
an important way that [they] will be accountable for [their] work” (Ibid.).  The annual 
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audits, required reporting, and participation in programs and training are all methods of 
FLO’s efforts towards transparency and stakeholder participation. 
Closely tied to the issue of transparency is the collapsing of the supply chain: 
reflecting an understanding of the economic and power disparities inherent in the classic 
coffee supply chain, FLO works directly with producer cooperatives, thus reducing the 
number of actors between the farmer and the roaster to just the cooperative and the 
importer. 
Finally, like many fair trade groups, the “ultimate aims” of FLO “are to achieve 
sustained improvements of the living and working conditions and the economic situation 
of small-scale farmers, workers and other producers” (Ibid.).  This reflects the practical 
and tangible aspects of development and recognizes the inherent disparities that exist 
geopolitically and throughout the supply chain.  As mentioned, FLO seeks to directly 
enhance the livelihoods of producers through the fair-trade price and premium system; 
indirectly, this system also works to dismantle some of the effects of commodity 
fetishism.  In appealing to the socially-conscious coffee buyer through a “fair trade” for 
farmers and small producers campaign, the consumers are connected to producers, and at 
least some of the obscurity caused by traditional coffee supply chains is lifted.   
Under its pricing scheme, “most products have a Fairtrade price, which is the 
minimum that must be paid to the producers.  In addition, producers get an additional 
sum, the Fairtrade Premium, to invest in their communities” (Ibid.).  Thus we see 
elements of development efforts aimed at the individual producer and also the 
community. 
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5.3: CROP TO CUP COFFEE COMPANY 
Based in the United States, C2C—a relatively new company--seeks to improve 
the lives of smallholders and producers in the coffee industry in developing countries by 
connecting individual farmers with their consumers; while C2C incorporates many of the 
same principles and processes of fair trade organizations, it other areas its approach 
differs markedly. 
With respect to smallholder empowerment, C2C is based on the belief that farmers 
are their own best advocates.  Thus, C2C considers its role as a service provider for 
farmers, rather than as just an importer, which allows the company to work towards its 
goals of farmer empowerment and increased market access for traditionally marginalized 
groups.  Like fair trade groups, C2C also considers the position of traditionally 
economically marginalized groups, small holders, and how the bias of international trade 
policy towards Western development models has negatively affected them.  C2C 
recognizes that small holders often lack social power, political voice, and any avenue for 
change and provides them with a possible space for political and social expression. 
As a response to these issues, C2C maintains a website online where customers and 
producers can directly interact via e-mail, discussion forums, videos and chat.  This 
empowers consumers to make more informed and ethical decisions regarding their 
coffee.  The web arena has also been helpful for small producers directly, providing 
updated information that is vital in order to become an effective competitor; this 
information ranges from customer demographics to growing techniques to the price of 
coffee on the international market.  In that most small holders in developing countries 
lack the knowledge, training and resources to access relevant information, C2C provides 
 43 
this training and information through its use of technology, primarily the internet, and 
direct employee-farmer interaction.  Also in the vein of the producer empowerment, C2C 
works with a third-party coffee consultant to provide farmers with feedback on their 
particular products.  This enables farmers to make more informed choices about their 
coffee business. 
Unlike most fair trade organizations, C2C has chosen not to participate in third-party 
certifications.  Instead, using technological resources and a strict policy of transparency, 
C2C aims to promote its coffee though farmer and consumer interaction and the concept 
of “consumer certification,” rather than consumers relying on certification by unknown 
(and often uninterested) third parties.  As such, C2C invites customers to “see for 
themselves” where their coffee is from, who grew it, and the benefits that consumer 
purchases can provide. 
Also, C2C aims to maintain ownership for both the farmer and the company over the 
coffee throughout the value chain.  Therefore, instead of working with cooperatives, C2C 
maintains relationships and agreements with individual farmers for purchasing; like the 
fair trade model, this reduces the number of actors on the supply chain between the 
farmer and the roaster, but goes even further in eliminating the cooperative and involving 
only the importer.  It should also be noted here that the premiums paid on the coffee go to 
Farmers Associations.  The Farmers Associations are democratically elected boards 
meant to be representative of the communities; it is these Associations that work as the 
point of contact for C2C. 
Finally, in its efforts to improve the standard of living for smallholder and 
producers of coffee in developing regions, C2C has a system of payments and premiums.   
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For coffee, C2C pays farmers $.30 above market value for all grades of coffee, in 
addition to premiums for quality performances or specialty coffee.  Also, C2C returns 
$.20 per roasted pound sold to the famers associations to be reinvested the community in 
a manner decided by local farmer’s associations: currently, the premiums are being put 
towards coffee seedling projects in order to increase local output.  These payments reflect 
efforts towards both individual development and community development. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
While the development goals of an improved standard of living and increased 
empowerment for smallholders and producers underscore both the fair trade and the 
direct trade movements in coffee, the approaches of both movements often differ in 
actual practice.  Using FLO as a representative of the fair trade movement and C2C as a 
representative of the direct trade movement, this discussion will focus on the overlaps,  
divergences, and gaps of approaches with respect to development goals, and, within the 
limits of the literature review, the theoretical implications for these approaches.  The 
overlaps described practices consistent with development goals and focus on price and 
premiums as ways of improving producers’ standard of living.  With respect towards 
efforts aimed at increasing producer empowerment, the overlaps focus on practices 
geared towards education and transparency, the collapsing of the supply chain, and 
consumer participation.  Again within the context of development discourse, the gaps 
included will focus on pre-export credit and the issues associated with certification.  
 
6.1: Overlaps: Price 
First, there are many areas where the approaches of FLO and C2C overlap.  With 
respect to the development goal of increasing the smallholder or producer’s standard of 
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living, both organizations pay a minimum amount for coffee at a price that is often well 
above what an independent smallholder might gain from a local middleman or broker.  
The current market value for coffee is $2.31 per pound (Bloomberg 2011).  For FLO, the 
minimum price for unwashed Arabica is set at $1.25 per pound, or the fair market value, 
whichever is higher.  This is the price paid at export.  Because FLO works with third-
party certifiers, the export price does not necessarily represent the price received by the 
individual farmer.  C2C pays $.30 over the market value price, and this price represents 
what is paid at the farmgate level: because C2C maintains relationships with individual 
farmers, it is able to pay them personally, as opposed to through a third-party certifier or 
exporter. 
For the smallholder, FLO’s set price may be an advantage because of its 
predictability and security. However, as the market for fair trade coffee and consumption 
increases, causing the price of coffee to rise to its current value, the amount paid by FLO 
represents no increase the market price a farmer might be able to get without a fair trade 
label.  Further, because the minimum price paid is at the export level, the farmer may 
receive less money than is actually represented by the price. 
On the other hand, C2C’s price scheme of $.30 over the market price is obviously 
advantageous to a producer in a market when the price is relatively high, as it is as of this 
writing.  Further, because C2C’s payment is made at the farmgate level, there is more 
certainty of the what the farmer actually receives.  However, if the price of coffee were to 
fall—and historically coffee’s price has indeed fallen very low (in 2001 the price was 
$.46 per pound)--then the absence of a price floor in C2C’s scheme might hurt 
smallholders (The Fair Trade Coffee Company 2009). 
 47 
In addition, it should be noted here that fair trade coffee is special coffee, and has 
higher quality standards than other types of coffee.  Most smallholders dealing in fair 
trade coffee sell only “a fraction of their coffee to the Fair Trade market and the rest to 
the conventional market” (Weber 2007, 112).  Thus, the actual impact of the higher 
prices generated through selling under a fair trade or direct-relation trade label may be 
minimal: C2C describes smallholders as family farmers who have around 250 trees on 
their lot; each coffee tree produces about one pound of roasted coffee.  The real impact of 
selling only a percentage of a harvest for a commodity whose price is relatively low 
translates into a minimal increase of income for most workers. 
However, C2C has recently launched its “Whole Crop” campaign.  Under this 
program C2C will purchase a farmer’s entire crop, working within various relationships 
to sell not just specialty coffee, but all other grades of coffee too.  The payment scheme is 
the same: $.30 over market price per pound and a $.20 premium for community 
investment.  This campaign thus not only works to increase the direct income paid to 
farmers but also their access to markets.  Currently, fair trade and direct trade coffee is 
exclusively a specialty commodity.  C2C’s efforts in this arena work to increase farmer’s 
direct access to previously unreachable markets. 
 
6.2: Premiums 
Also with respect to improving the standard of living of producers, both FLO and 
C2C pay farmers premiums.  FLO pays $.10 per pound sold and C2C pays $.20 per  
pound sold.  In both cases, the premium is reinvested into the local communities of the 
producer or producer organizations: for FLO, the outcomes of these reinvestments vary, 
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while for C2C all premiums are being reinvested into a community seedling project.  
These premiums reflect a community-focused development approach and also work to 
establish the legitimacy of the organizations within the region. 
 
6.3: Empowerment 
Empowerment to producers is also a core principle that both FLO and C2C 
consider crucial to achieving development goals.  Echoing the sentiment of postcolonial 
and emancipatory literature, the involvement of populations within development efforts is 
often necessary for its success; in other words, local knowledge is important to the 
success of development projects because local people know their situation best (see 
Ferguson 1994). With FLO, producer organizations are involved in the standard-setting 
process through review and feedback.  C2C invites farmers to offer feedback via the 
internet, allowing for a transparent discussion in an open forum.  Both of these 
approaches are admirable in that they attempt to increase the role for the producers.  
However, FLO’s model may be more efficient, in that the cooperatives provide the 
feedback, not the individual producers, conceivably lessening the burden of streamlining 
possible issues for FLO.  On the other hand, while C2C’s model for farmer feedback 
allows for individual voice and an open discussion, the practical problems associated 
with farmer participation in such a technical system might mean that this approach 
represents a better theory than practice. 
Both FLO and C2C engage in education and training for the producers.  FLO 
maintains a Producer Services and Relations Unit that provides training in local 
languages, offers guidance on certification requirements, helps producers to gain access 
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to new markets, and facilitates relationships with buyers (FLO 2009).  C2C also provides 
training and education to farmers on farming practices, organizational management, and 
technological guidance.  This focus on training and guidance of both organizations 
recognizes the importance of capacity-building for development, and rejects the notion of 
trusteeship that is so often found in development efforts.  These efforts are also important 
for helping farmers to gain market access as both organizations help farmers to establish 
relationships with buyers, and thus consumers, in developed countries. 
 
6.4: Supply Chain 
Both FLO and C2C employ relationships that collapse the supply chain.  While 
the traditional coffee supply chain can include the producer, a local buyer or middleman, 
a processor, an exporter, an importer, a roaster, a retailer, and the consumer.  Generally, 
with each time the coffee bean changes hands so does its legal ownership.  First, this can 
have negative effects on quality control because the actors do not have an incentive to 
maintain high levels of quality for those at the end of the coffee’s journey.  Second, 
however, complex and multi-actor supply chains encourage what Marx called 
“commodity fetishism,” hiding the true reality of the producer’s condition. It seems that 
more actors in a supply chain make it easier to obscure the producer’s reality, and by 
limiting the number of actors and maintaining relationships with producers that veil can 
be lifted. 
Here, however, there again is a difference in the approach between FLO and C2C.  
FLO has effectively collapsed the coffee supply chain to function so there are only two 
actors between the farmer and the roaster on the supply chain: the cooperative and the 
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importer.  Because C2C maintains relationships with individual farmers, the number of 
actors between the farmer and the roaster on the supply chain is only one, the importer. 
 
6.5: Consumers 
Also with respect to commodity fetishism, it should also be noted here that both 
organizations and models are geared towards empowering consumers to make informed 
ethical decisions regarding the products they buy and the companies they support. Both 
movements are consumer-driven, and ultimately assume that without demand there will 
be no sustained change.    Therefore, unlike other social justice movements in which 
change is led by peoples in developing countries, both the fair trade and direct relations 
trade movements are sustained by the consumers in developed countries who attempt to 
use their economic positions and choices to counter the negative effects of globalization. 
 
6.7: Gaps: Pre-Export Credit 
Next this discussion will turn to the areas where there is a gap, or where one 
movement fails to address one issue that the other does address. One gap in the practices 
of FLO and C2C concerns pre-export credit.  FLO provides that “up to 60% of the 
purchase price should be pre-financed to the producer organizations” (FLO 2009).  
Because coffee generally requires a seasonal harvest, most coffee farmers generate only 
one coffee harvest per year, and thus, often coffee farmers only get paid once a year 
(Painter 1984, 281).  Pre-export credit allows farmers to have access to finances if needed 
before payment, allowing for greater financial security and, ultimately, empowerment.  
C2C does not offer pre-export credit on the ground that its purchase price is high enough 
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that pre-export credit is not necessary for the producers.  Here, it seems that C2C is also 
guilty of failing to acknowledge the realities of most producers in developing countries 
and the benefits that a system of pre-export credit would create for them. 
 
6.8: Certification 
One of the most striking of the gaps in the practices of FLO and C2C is with 
respect to certification: as mentioned, FLO’s system for ensuring and signaling fairly 
traded products is based on third-party certification.  However, C2C has consciously 
rejected the certification system.  As mentioned, for most fair trade and FLO purposes 
smallholders and individual producers are organized into cooperatives. As Bart Slob 
points out, “the precise amount of direct additional income a farmer receives through Fair 
Trade is difficult to calculate.  Payments to smallholder farmers vary according to the co-
operatives’ handling of debt servicing, co-operative expenses, distribution of Fair Trade 
social premiums, etc” (2006, 28).  Thus, this raises issues of corruption and 
accountability, as well as the practical question of whether the method of channeling 
profits through co-operatives actually frustrates fair trades purpose of significantly 
contributing to individual producer welfare.  In her article “Does Fair Trade Coffee Lift 
Growers Out of Poverty or Simply Ease Our Guilty Conscience?,” Jill Richardson says 
that for coffee growers, “after the cooperative takes its cut, growers receive an estimated 
20 to 50 cents under the price paid to the cooperatives” (2010).  This can significantly 
undercut the amount that fair trade companies imply is paid directly to the farmer, further 
frustrating the fair trade movement’s goals of contributing to development by increasing 
farmer income and quality of life. 
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Standard-setting and certification by independent third parties can be understood 
as what Mary Kay Gugerty describes as “voluntary accountability,” whereby 
corporations and non-profits can “signal” to consumers a particular level of quality and 
adherence to an often very specific set of standards (2009, 243).   As mentioned, these 
standards often require a minimum price paid to producers, sustainability practices, fair 
labor practices, and environmentally friendly production processes.  Of course, the 
requirements of the standards themselves can sometimes be a barrier for smallholders and 
family farmers.  As Bart Slob points out, large “estate owners might be able to invest in 
certification or labeling processes, but most small-scale producers simply do not have the 
financial resources to pay for this” (2006, 51). 
Also, although the terms of the certification process are transparent, the processes 
themselves are not.  For example, FLO-CERT explains on its website that the audits 
(where an individual auditor physically visits the sites under consideration for 
certification) vary in length and intensity; this raises concerns of “rubber-stamping,” the 
idea that an auditor will only conduct a cursory investigation, and be shown a few choice 
plots or productions facilities as representatives of a site’s general practices; however, as 
producer organizations and cooperatives can have hundreds of members—and thus 
thousands of acres of trees—that certification can actually serve to hide the reality of the 
origin and practices of that particular commodity. 
Also, there is the question of enforcement: as described in the process above, if a 
auditor discovers a non-conformity within a particular applicant’s practices, the producer 
may suggest a remedy, and if agreed upon, that remedy is implemented; however, the 
auditor does not physically reassess the site to ensure compliance standards.  Again, this 
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raises concerns about uniformity in both practices and quality for products that are fair 
trade certified. 
Further, even the application process itself can be a barrier for small holders.  As 
described, the FLO application for certification requires a 500 euro fee; if certified, the 
producer organizations then pay annual fees depending on the size of the organization.  
Although FLO has some programs in place to help smallholders overcome this barrier, it 
still presents problems.  With respect to the developing world and most coffee-producing 
nations, these prices can be an insurmountable obstacle for a small family farmer.  For 
example, for a small producer organization of less than fifty members is charged an 
annual fee of approximately US $1544. 95 (FLO-CERT 2010).  However, in Uganda (a 
country whose main export is coffee), where the average family income is $320, this can 
be a formidable barrier to entry of the fair trade market: farmers will have to reach out 
further in order to find members and funds for cooperative certification, thus causing 
even more complications when considering quality control and practice uniformity (U.S. 
Department of State, 2010; Restoration of Hope, 2010). 
In addition, “because most fair trade ATO’s certify only co-ops, the poorest of the 
poor, namely landless workers on large coffee plantations” or family farmers who 
manage only a very small plot “are untouched by fair trade” (Hira and Ferrie 2006, 110).  
This means first that individual producers must organize into a cooperative, a method that 
can be a challenge for individuals for varying reasons, including geographic, 
disagreement over processes of production, and requirements of the cooperative that the 
individual producer is unable or unwilling to meet.  As Jeremy Weber puts it, “entering 
the fair trade…market…presents major difficulties for young producer organizations.  
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Without assistance from development organizations or export companies, the very 
organizations and producers that Fair Trade targets have little chance of participating in 
the market” (Weber 2007, 109).  Of course, most cooperatives require dues or fees of 
some sort for administrative purposes, but without oversight or transparency, and 
especially in situations where access to information and organizing techniques are 
limited, the cooperatives themselves can discourage individual producers from 
participating in the fair trade movement. 
It is these economically marginalized groups that are most in need of the benefits 
of fair trade but are least able to access them.  With coffee, for instance, more than 25 
million people around the world rely on income from coffee to participate in formal 
economies (FLO 2009).  Further, of all the coffee in the world that is produced (and it is 
the second-largest commodity behind oil), more than half is produced by family farmers 
(James 2000).  This means that family farmers might often lack the resources necessary 
for fair trade market access, namely a cooperative membership or the funds for a 
certification application fee.  The failure of the fair trade movement to directly address 
these issues echoes the problems associated with development discourse and 
universalism.  Here, it seems that the practice of fair trade organizations of using 
certification systems--whereby large groups of the population which are intended to be 
the beneficiaries of development efforts are left out of those efforts—are underwritten by 
assumptions of producer realities.   In the case of certification, these assumptions are 
related to the technical, financial, political, and organizational requirements that must be 
met in order for family farmers to be certified fair trade. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The comparison of the practices between FLO and C2C highlights the 
commendable efforts made by organizations worldwide in addressing the disparities 
produced by globalization.  In an effort to work within the established market system, fair 
trade and direct relations trade groups have brought both an increased standard of living 
for producers in the Global South and awareness and education for consumers in the 
North.  As demand for fair trade continues to rise and new commodities becomes 
recognized within that arena, there exist more and more opportunities for these efforts to 
result in real change. 
The overlaps between the fair trade movement and direct relations trade--as 
represented by the claims of FLO and C2C--emphasize some of these positive changes.  
Both organizations claim to seek to advance goals related to development and producer 
empowerment, and thus reflect overall trends of the discourse surrounding these 
concepts.  As a response, C2C represents an evolution of fair trade strategies and 
discussion, offering indications of where the movement is going and how it attempts to 
meet those goals. 
With respect to development, both organizations seek to increase the standard of 
living for producers through higher and fairer payment systems.  Both organizations 
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incorporate a payment scheme that provides greater financial security for producers in 
addition to premiums for reinvestment in those communities.  While each payment 
scheme has different benefits, the most important difference seems to be in where the 
payment is made: for FLO, it is paid at the export level, while C2C pays at the farmgate 
level. 
This is also closely tied to the process of collapsing the supply chain.  First, both 
FLO and C2C seek to collapse the supply chain in a way that makes the conditions of the 
farmer visible to the consumer.  The emphasis on the consumer’s ethical choice in coffee-
drinking highlights the disparities in the supply chain and the labor or of the producer, 
addressing—at least indirectly—the effects of commodity fetishism.  It is interesting to 
note that per the lifting of the obscurity of the producer under fair trade and direct 
relations trade models, the consumer can no longer claim ignorance of the reality of 
conditions for producers in developing countries.  With time, consumers may expand 
these notions to markets and producers of other commodities, truly realizing the goal of 
fair trade.    
 Because C2C maintains a supply chain in which there is only one actor between 
the roaster and the farmer—the importer— it is thus able to pay at the farmgate level.  
C2C purchases a farmer’s entire harvest, while FLO sells specialty coffee exclusively.  
On the other hand, FLO’s process of third-party certifiers and relationships with 
cooperatives necessitates payment at the export level.  While both represent an 
improvement over the traditional payments made to coffee farmers, C2C’s approach 
represents a more transparent and traceable model, and the “Whole Crop” campaign 
seems to be an innovative effort to make an even bigger impact on farmer income. 
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With respect to producer empowerment, both movements have processes in place 
to allow producer input: for FLO, it is in the form of feedback on standard-setting and 
organizational issues.  For C2C, producers are invited to give feedback on the internet in 
open forums.  Both of these schemes address problems identified within the general 
development discourse—namely, a lack of farmer participation and feedback.  However, 
while both schemes are noble efforts, each seems problematic.  First, FLO allows 
producer feedback within a limited framework and the feedback is generally presented by 
the cooperative.  This raises concerns of transparency in addition to the worry that 
individual producers may not have an adequate voice.   For C2C, its system requires 
access to the internet, which is not always a readily-available technology.   This might be 
seen as an unfortunate tendency of development organizations to universalize programs 
and, indeed, people: in this case, while the goal of feedback as a means of producer 
empowerment might be an admirable aim, the failure to account for the individual 
producer’s reality may in fact render any benefits unsustainable.  There, while both 
organization’s efforts related to producer input seem be encouraging steps towards 
producer empowerment, future researchers may want to consider different ways that 
farmers’ voices might be best incorporated into these processes with respect to their 
social and economic realities.   
The practice of many fair trade organizations of offering pre-export credit seems 
to be an excellent practice, in tune with progressive development discourse and 
consideration of local conditions for producers.  Further, pre-export credit is consistent 
with notions of empowerment in that it encourages financial security by allowing 
producers more options and thus more control.  As pre-export credit supports financial 
 58 
security for producers, and future fair trade efforts and direct relations trade organizations 
ought to consider the benefits that pre-export credit can bring to producers. 
The certification processes used by many fair trade organizations also require 
closer inspection.   For many smallholders the certifications process has developed into a 
set of barriers that fail to consider real physical, financial, and social conditions of famers 
in developing countries.  First, there is the issue of payment to those farmers, as the fair 
trade minimum price is the price paid to “organizations of producers, but not to 
individual producers” (Weber 2007, 11).  Thus, individual farmers may be receiving 
much less than what is the standard that is advertised under the fair trade label.  Not only 
does this raise questions about the impact on the farmer’s standard of living, but 
ultimately the direct impact on the organization’s ability to achieve its stated 
development goals.   
Second, the use of third-party certifiers raises questions of accountability and 
concerns over “rubber-stamping.”  As fair trade and direct trade emphasize transparency 
and accountability as a means of producer empowerment, the use of third-party certifiers 
is presented as a method of supporting those goals; more research is needed on whether 
these concerns are actual threats to system’s integrity.  However, certification also raises 
questions about enforcement and oversight of standards and regulations, especially when 
many of the managing groups are non-profit organizations with limited funds and 
resources.   
Third, the application process itself, both with its standards requirements for 
production and its application fees, can certainly be a challenge to family farmers.  
Closely tied to that is the fact that most fair trade certification organizations deal only 
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with cooperatives can be problematic for individual producers who, for whatever reasons, 
are unable or unwilling to organize with closely-situated and like-minded producers.  
These concerns again relate to the criticism of universality found in development 
discourse, and certainly administrative issues such as an application process have a 
defense of efficiency.  On the other hand, in light of the stated goals of development and 
empowerment for producers, it seems that a more flexible approach that accounted for the 
economic realities of producers in developing countries would be more consistent with 
the overall trajectory of the discourse.   
Finally, as the fair trade market has expanded from church groups selling 
handicrafts to a multi-billion dollar a year industry, different organizations are competing 
more directly with each other and seeking out different ways of specializing their 
products further—like by carrying multiple certifications.  The comparison of FLO and 
C2C in this discussion is an example of this, and it is possible that these internal divisions 
within the fair trade movement may further jeopardize its sustainability.  However, while 
this may be seen as a challenge, it may also open the proverbial “marketplace of ideas” to 
other models of trade, ones that may or may not work within the classic market 
structures, or ones that do or do not address the same disparity issues fair trade seeks to 
address.   
In addition, this analysis may prove helpful to the emerging market and 
movements surrounding organic, biodynamic and other certifications.  First, it may be 
informative on guidance for best practices or programs for maximum producer impact.  
Second, the sustainability of movements often requires a certain degree of cohesion and 
organization between all actors involved; as discussed above, the divisions and differing 
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approaches within the fair trade movement may open it to more risks.  Finally, like fair 
trade, these newer certifications are consumer-driven, and organizations seeking to 
advance their goals should consider ways to increase the role and participation of 
consumers.  
Ultimately, it seems that in light of these criticisms, although fair trade is an 
admirable step in the right direction, there are still several issues that need to be 
addressed if it is to meet the goals of development and producer empowerment.  Future 
researchers might be interested in looking at some issues raised in this discussion, 
including market access and barriers for economically marginalized groups, in order to 
better refine and improve the fair trade movement as it continues to grow. 
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